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III. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from a portion of a circuit court judgment 
which resolved all claims between the parties, and from the 
court's denial of a motion to reconsider. Rule 54(b) is not at 
issue. 
Pacific Bay timely filed its notice of appeal following the 
trial court's denial of its motion to reconsider. This Court has 
jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2) (d) . 
IV. STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This is an appeal over attorney's fees. 
G&K sued Pacific Bay for its alleged failure to make 
payments on a lease, and for liquidated damages arising from 
Pacific Bay's alleged premature termination of the contract. 
After it stipulated to a partial judgment at tne outset of trial, 
Pacific Bay prevailed on the claim which was actually tried. 
However, the trial court awarded fees to G&K alone under the 
parties' contract. 
A. ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court err in finding the "net judgment 
rule" dispositive of this case? 
2. Did the trial court err in not awarding Pacific Bay any 
fees, when Pacific Bay defeated G&K :n the only claim tried, and 
the parties' contract provided that fees would be awarded to the 
successful party? 
3. Did the trial court err bv deciding that Pacific Bay 
would be adequately compensated for its fees if the court simply 
4 
deducted an amount from G&K's award, when the law in any event 
prevented G&K from recovering fees expended in its failure at 
trial? 
4. Did the trial court err by not making specific findings 
of fact concerning the fees awarded to G&K? 
5. If the law in Utah permits there to be only one 
successful party in a lawsuit, regardless of the number of 
discrete claims litigated therein, did the trial court err in 
finding that G&K was that party when Pacific Bay prevailed on the 
only claim tried? 
B. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Pacific Bay challenges none of the trial court's 
factual findings, although in issue 4 Pacific Bay does challenge 
the trial court's failure to make adequate findings. G&K has not 
filed a cross-appeal. 
Factual findings are not in dispute. This case thus 
presents a question of law: did the trial court correctly apply 
the law of attorney's fees to the circumstances before it? 
This court reviews issues of law for correctness, affording 
the lower court no deference. Commercial Union Associates v. 
Clayton, 863 P.2d 29, 36 (Utah App. 1993). See also Barnard v. 
Wassermann, 855 P.2d 243, 247 (Utah 1993) (when record reveals no 
factual disputes, court considers whether law was correctly 
applied) . * 
1
 Several cases refer to reviewing fee awards for an "abuse of 
discretion." See, e.g., Paul Mueller Co. v. Cache Valley Dairy 
Ass'n, 657 P.2d 1279, 1287 (Utah 1982); Ouinn v. Ouinn (In re 
Ouinn), 830 P.2d 282, 285 (Utah App. 1992). These cases, 
(continued...) 
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V. STATUTES AND RULES 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, rules or 
regulations applicable to his appeal. 
VI. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
At issue is the interpretation of a contractual attorney's 
fees provision. 
G&K leases textiles. Pacific Bay is a bakery. G&K and 
Pacific Bay entered into a contract under which G&K leased to 
Pacific Bay sales uniforms and other work clothes. G&K 
ultimately sued Pacific Bay, alleging two contract claims. 
First, G&K alleged that Pacific Bay had terminated the contract 
prematurely, entitling G&K to liquidated damages. Second, G&K 
sought damages for Pacific Bay's alleged failure to pay for 
services rendered. 
At the outset of trial, Pacific Bay stipulated to judgment 
in a sum certain on G&K's second claim, but stated it owed 
nothing to G&K on the liquidated damages claim and would so 
prove. The parties then tried the liquidated damages claim and 
several smaller issues involved in the open account claim. 
1
 (...continued) 
however, almost always are directed to the issue of the award's 
amount. But see Stacey Properties v. Wixen, 766 P.2d 1080, 1085, 
1988, cert, denied, 779 P.2d 688 (Utah 1989) ("[w]e conclude that 
the trial court abused its discretion" by failing to enforce fee 
clause of parties' contract). 
Pacific Bay questions not the amount of fees awarded to G&K 
(except insofar as such a challenge is indicated in issue 4), but 
instead the trial court's application of law--to now unchallenged 
facts--in deciding who was entitled to an award. 
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At the conclusion of trial, the court found for Pacific Bay 
on the liquidated damages claim and on all but one of the other 
peripheral issues which were tried. However, stating that it 
felt bound to do so by the "net judgment rule" of Mountain States 
Broadcasting v. Neale. 783 P.2d 551 (Utah App. 1989), cert, 
denied, 853 P.2d 897 (1993), the court found that G&K was the 
"prevailing party" and thus entitled to fees since it had 
received an affirmative recovery through Pacific Bay's 
stipulation to judgment. The court declined to award Pacific Bay 
any fees, although it did reduce the amount of fees G&K 
requested. 
Following trial, Pacific Bay moved for reconsideration on 
the fee issue. The court denied the motion without comment. 
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Neither party has challenged the facts as found by the trial 
court or the legal conclusions reached by the court on G&K's 
contract claims. The crux of this appeal is instead the award of 
attorney's fees which the court made as a result of the 
conclusions it reached on G&K's claims. Pacific Bay will thus 
only briefly set forth the facts as adduced at trial. 
The parties' entered into their contract on April 12, 1988. 
A copy of the contract is attached to the complaint, Record, p. 
5, and addendum to this brief ("Addendum"), Exhibit A. Under the 
contract, G&K leased sales uniforms and other work clothes to 
Pacific Bay. 
This litigation was set in motion on December 23, 1991. On 
that day, G&K refused to deliver uniforms and work clothes to 
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Pacific Bay because Pacific Bay did not have a check ready for 
G&K's driver. Record, p. 270, Ins. 1-15. As a result of G&K's 
failure to deliver, Pacific Bay procured another uniform 
supplier. Record, p. 329, Ins. 22-23. G&K then filed its 
complaint, alleging that Pacific Bay had terminated the contract 
early and thus was obligated to pay liquidated damages under the 
contract. G&K also sought payment for services rendered.2 
Under the contract as written, payment was required on a 
monthly basis. However, in its opening statement Pacific Bay 
stated it would prove that the contract had been modified by the 
parties' course of performance to permit payment on a 60 day 
term, that a check was not due G&K on December 23, 1991 under the 
contract as modified, and that G&K's refusal to deliver on that 
date was thus a breach of the contract which entitled Pacific Bay 
to look elsewhere for uniforms. Record, p. 222, Ins. 4-25; p. 
223, Ins. 1-20. 
At the outset of trial, Pacific Bay agreed that it owed G&K 
$3,790.02 on account. Record, p. 226, Ins. 24-25; p. 227, Ins. 
1-13; p. 228, Ins. 3-7. Pacific Bay disputed that it owed G&K 
for the invoice representing the uniforms which G&K refused to 
2
 Pacific Bay first appeared pro se. When this case was 
initially scheduled for trial, Pacific Bay did not appear. The 
court then entered a default judgment. Pacific Bay retained 
counsel, and moved to set aside the default on the grounds that 
it did not receive notice of the trial and had meritorious 
defenses. The trial court set aside the default, but required 
Pacific Bay to pay G&K's fees in opposing the motion to set 
aside, as well as its fees for trial preparation and appearance. 
Record, p. 50. 
Pacific Bay does not claim that setting aside a default 
judgment is any great triumph. Nonetheless, G&K has now been 
compensated twice for its lawyers' efforts. 
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deliver, and disputed the last invoice received from G&K on the 
grounds that G&K had improperly computed depreciation for 
uniforms which were not returned to it. Record, p. 225, Ins. 1-
25; p. 226, Ins 1-4. As the court noted, the trial thus 
"focus[ed] in" on the liquidated damages claim and the two 
disputed invoices at issue in the claim for payment due. Record, 
p. 228, Ins. 8-11. 
In support of its argument that the parties had modified the 
payment terms of the contract through their course of dealing, 
Pacific Bay testified that it consistently made payments on a 60 
day cycle. Record, p. 324, Ins. 12-16; p. 347, Ins. 11-24; p. 
348, Ins. 1-9. While G&K testified that it warned Pacific Bay by 
telephone about being in arrears on the account, Record, p. 262, 
Ins. 3-25; p. 263, Ins. 9-25, Pacific Bay testified otherwise. 
Record, p. 354, Ins. 24-25; p. 355, Ins. 1-17. The trial court 
credited Pacific Bay's testimony on this issue and discounted 
that of G&K. Record, p. 387, Ins. 23-25; p. 388, Ins. 1-3; p. 
397, Ins. 24-25; p. 398, Ins. 1-25; p. 399, Ins. 1-5.3 
Save for the (discounted) testimony concerning the warnings 
allegedly given Pacific Bay, the thrust of G&K's case at trial 
went to establishing G&K's internal concerns over the Pacific Bay 
account, which presumably supplied another basis for G&K's 
refusal to deliver uniforms absent a check. However, the trial 
3
 G&K also testified that a Pacific Bay check had been 
returned for insufficient funds, allegedly further evidencing the 
problems G&K claimed it had with the account. Record, p. 267, 
Ins. 8-16. Pacific Bay's controller testified that no such check 
existed in Pacific Bay's files. Record, p. 349, Ins. 19-25. The 
trial court credited Pacific Bay's testimony. Record, p. 3 98, 
Ins. 4-6. 
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court found it peculiar that for all of G&K's testimony about the 
problems with Pacific Bay, G&K had adduced no written evidence at 
trial documenting these concerns, including any correspondence 
with Pacific Bay on the issue. Record, p. 386, In. 25; p. 387, 
Ins. 1-13; p. 398, Ins. 13-25; 399, Ins. 1-5. 
As a result of the testimony and other evidence received at 
trial, the court accepted Pacific Bay's position, finding that 
G&K had acquiesced in a 60 day payment term, and that the 
parties7 course of performance modified the contract to provide 
for such a term. Record, p. 397, Ins. 5-10; Ins 20-23. The 
court therefore found, again agreeing with Pacific Bay, that G&K 
terminated the contract early by demanding payment when it was 
not due, Record, p. 3 99, Ins. 6-10, and that as the terminating 
party G&K had no claim for liquidated damages. Record, p. 339, 
Ins. 6-10. The Court also found that G&K was not entitled to 
payment for the goods which G&K did not deliver, since, while G&K 
attempted to deliver the goods again a week following its refusal 
first to deliver, G&K had already breached the contract by then. 
Record, p. 400, In. 25; p. 401, Ins. 1-9. 
At trial, the court found for G&K only on one portion of one 
of the disputed invoices. In particular, the court found as fact 
that Pacific Bay had not returned certain uniforms to G&K, and 
thus had been properly charged for those uniforms. Record, p. 
400, Ins. 16-21. However, even on this issue the court agreed 
with Pacific Bay that G&K had improperly depreciated the 
unreturned uniforms, Record, p. 383, Ins. 20-25, p. 384, Ins. 1-
14, and that G&K was to follow the method "most beneficial 
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towards the defense." Id. at 384, Ins. 12-14, p. 399, Ins. 16-
25; p. 400, Ins. 1-15. 
The trial court thus ruled for Pacific Bay on all but one 
issue which was actually tried. Most importantly, the court 
found for Pacific Bay on the entire liquidated damages claim, the 
testimony and argument on which consumes 114 pages of the 
reporter's transcript.4 The court nonetheless found that under 
Mountain States Broadcasting, G&K was the prevailing party in the 
litigation since it had received a "net judgment", and thus G&K, 
but not Pacific Bay, was entitled to fees under the parties' 
contract. Record, p. 401, Ins. 19-20; p. 402, Ins. 6-10, 23-25; 
p. 403, Ins. 1-10, p. 407, Ins. 1-12. Acknowledging that Pacific 
Bay prevailed on what the court termed "some issues", the court 
did reduce G&K's fee request from $2,080.00 to $1,450.00, stating 
that it was "apportioning" fees. Record, p. 403, Ins. 11-25; p. 
404, Ins. 1-12. 
In making its award, the court stated that Pacific Bay's 
victory was not worth much in comparison to the stipulated 
judgment, Record, p. 401, Ins. 24-25; p. 402, Ins. 1-6, 
emphasized that Pacific Bay had not made an offer of judgment 
before trial, and noted that Pacific Bay sought to vacate the 
whole default judgment early on in the case, not simply the 
liquidated damages portion. Record, p. 402, Ins. 11-22. 
4
 Record, pp. 221-224, 228-247, 251-252, 254-282, 284-299, 
308-310, 322-349, 354-357, 360-367, 373-380, 381, 388-396. The 
remainder of the time was spent on the invoice for undelivered 
goods, upon which Pacific Bay prevailed, on the issue of 
depreciation, upon which Pacific Bay prevailed, and on the issue 
of which uniforms were returned, upon which G&K prevailed. 
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The court's decision on attorney's fees was the subject of 
extensive colloquy between the court and counsel, during which 
the point was preserved. Record, p. 371, In. 25; p. 372, p. 373, 
Ins. 1-8; p. 405, Ins. 15-25; p. 406, p. 407, Ins. 1-12. 
The trial court's rulings at the conclusion of trial are 
summarized as follows in its findings and conclusions, at Record, 
p. 134 and Addendum, Exhibit B:5 
Findings of Fact 
4. For approximately three years . . . G&K continued 
to honor its end of the contract while accepting payments 
from Pacific Bay on an approximately 60-day term basis 
contrary to the provisions of the contract. 
5. G&K's acquiescence in allowing Pacific Bay to 
establish a long record of payments for a term longer than 
specified in the contract constituted a course of 
performance. 
6. Pacific Bay did not provide a check on December 23 
or 24 because G&K prematurely demanded payment for previous 
services when such payment was not yet due. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
6. As a result of the parties' course of performance 
over the years 1989, 1990 and 1991, the payment terms 
pursuant to the contract were modified from a net-10 term 
where payment was due on the tenth of the next month to a 
net-60 day term where the amounts owing were due sixty days 
later. This course of performance which modified the 
contract under the Uniform Commercial Code, was of the 
nature where the defendant would pay a month's worth of 
invoices sixty days after the last invoice in that month. 
When plaintiff prematurely demanded payment on December 23rd 
and failed to deliver the goods it breached its contract 
A copy of the judgment is included in the Addendum as 
Exhibit C. 
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with defendant, and they are not entitled to collect 
liquidated damages otherwise provided for in the contract. 
7. However, plaintiffs are entitled as the prevailing 
party in this action to compensation for their attorneys' 
fees and costs. 
Following trial, Pacific Bay filed a motion for alteration 
or amendment of the judgment, Record, p. 75, and supporting 
memorandum, id., p. 77, again arguing that it was entitled to 
fees for work done in defeating G&K's claim for liquidated 
damages, and resubmitting its affidavits, which showed that 
Pacific Bay's fees were devoted entirely to issues on which 
Pacific Bay succeeded at trial, including time spent researching 
the law of course of performance, drafting a trial brief, and 
preparing for trial. Record, pp. 87-92. After G&K responded, 
Record, p. 124, and Pacific Bay replied, id., p. 146, the court 
denied the motion without comment. Record, p. 160. 
VII. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
A. The trial court erroneously found that Mountain States 
Broadcastincr Co. v. Neale supplies the rule of decision in this 
case. 
B. Because it fully prevailed on the major contested claim 
at trial, Pacific Bay is entitled to its fees for the time spent 
in preparation for and participation at trial, regardless of 
whether G&K is entitled to fees. 
C. G&K, like any litigant, was not entitled to fees 
attributable to its failure at trial. The trial court's 
reduction of G&K's fees as a means of acknowledging Pacific Bay's 
success at trial did not provide Pacific Bay that to which it is 
entitled, but instead only effected a reduction which under the 
13 
law was not optional. The court was obligated to award Pacific 
Bay fees for its success a trial, regardless of any cut made to 
G&K's fees. 
D. The trial court erred in not making specific findings 
and conclusions concerning the amount of fees awarded to G&K. 
E. To the extent Utah law permits there to be only one 
"successful party", the trial court erred in ruling that G&K was 
that party. 
VIII. ARGUMENT 
Conclusion of Law no. 6 carefully details G&K's breach of 
the contract. Under Conclusion of Law no. 7, "however", G&K (and 
implicitly, G&K alone) is entitled to fees. "However" serves its 
qualifying purpose well here, for the court's rulings on the 
substantive claim at trial is at loggerheads with its subsequent 
refusal to award Pacific Bay any fees. 
A. The Net Judgment Rule does not Control this Case. 
While it did not set them forth under separate headings in 
its complaint, G&K alleged two breach of contract claims against 
Pacific Bay. The first sought liquidated damages arising from 
Pacific Bay's alleged premature termination of the contract. The 
second demanded payment for services. 
Although Pacific Bay prevailed in toto on the liquidated 
damages claim--the only claim tried--the trial court concluded 
that the "net judgment" (which was the result of a stipulation) 
was in G&K's favor, and thus G&K--but not Pacific Bay--was 
entitled to fees under Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale. 
On this point, the court erred as a matter of law. 
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In Brown v. Richards, 840 P.2d 143 (Utah App. 1992), cert, 
denied, 853 P.2d 897 (1993), this Court noted that the Mountain 
States net judgment rule is "disfavored". Id. at 155, n. 10. In 
Occidental/Nebraska Fed. Sav. Bank v. Mehr, 791 P.2d 217 (Utah 
App. 1990), the Court declined to follow the Mountain States net 
judgment rule on facts similar to those at bar. 
In Occidental/Nebraska, the parties disputed which of two 
trust deed foreclosure sales was valid. The defendants argued 
that the first sale controlled the amount of deficiency and 
stipulated to that amount at trial. The plaintiff urged that the 
first sale was defective, and thus that the much higher 
deficiency established at the second sale controlled. The 
defendants prevailed on the "validity" issue and hence suffered 
judgment only in the amount to which they stipulated. The trial 
court awarded the defendants fees as the prevailing party. The 
bank appealed. This Court summarized the dispute: 
Occidental contends that because a judgment was entered in 
its favor, it is the prevailing party in this lawsuit and 
should collect fees. The Mehrs, on the other hand, argue 
that, while a judgment was entered against them, they 
prevailed on the only contested issue at trial, i.e., the 
validity of the first trustee's sale. 
Id. at 221. After noting the "particular facts" of Mountain 
States, id. , the Court of Appeals summarized Utah law on 
attorney's fees: 
Where there was a right to attorney fees, Utah courts 
have allowed the party who successfully prosecuted or 
defended against a claim to recover the fees attributable to 
those claims on which the party was successful. See 
Mountain States, 783 P.2d at] 566 n. 10 (reasonable fee 
excludes amounts attributable to issues or claims on which 
party otherwise entitle to fee was unsuccessful); Stacey 
Properties v. Wixen, 766 P.2d 1080, 1085 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988) (defendant was entitled to attorney fees on the 
15 
counterclaims on which he was successful as well as for his 
successful defense of plaintiff's attempt to accelerate a 
promissory note), cert, denied, 779 P.2d 688 (Utah 1989); 
see also Graco F:-hing & Rental Tools, Inc. v. Ironwood 
Exploration, Inc. 766 P.2d 1074, 1080 (Utah 1988) (grant of 
attorney fees was remanded for a determination of only those 
fees attributable to the pursuit of successful claims). 
Noting 1) that the defendants had stipulated before trial that 
they owed the bank $7,300 (the deficiency from the first sale), 
and 2) that the trial itself thus centered on the issue of which 
sale was valid, the court held that fees and costs had properly 
been awarded to the defendants since they prevailed on the "only 
contested issue at trial", i.e., whether the deficiency would be 
based on first or second sale. Id. at 221-222. 
Pacific Bay agreed at the outset of trial that it owed G&K a 
certain amount, but no more Pacific Bay then defeated G&K on 
the only contested claim tried. Mountain States does not control 
this case. 
B. Regardless of Whether G&K is Entitled to Fees, Pacific 
Bay is Entitled to Fees for Successfully Defending 
Against G&K's Claim for Liquidated Damages. 
Under Occidental, a party is not disenfranchised from 
receiving fees simply because its success is measured by the 
extent of a claim defeated rather than a judgment received. 
While Occidental does not specifically address the issue, a 
defendant (such as Pacific Bay) remains entitled to fees for a 
successful defense against a claim even when the plaintiff 
prevails on a different claim. 
Modern rules of procedure permit liberal joinder of claims. 
Utah.R.Civ.P. 18. Thus, multiple-claim actirns are today the 
rule. CiL_ Elder v. Triax Co., 740 P.2d 1320, 1322 (Utah 1987) 
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(discussing rigid terminology and limitations at common law 
governing counterclaim practice). 
A party may prevail on some but not all claims alleged. 
When this occurs, each party is awarded fees commensurate with 
its success. See Trayner v. Cushinq, 688 P.2d 856, 858 (Utah 
1984) (per curiam) (where each party was successful on one or 
more points and unsuccessful on others, the trial court erred in 
applying "net judgment" rule to award fees only to plaintiffs)6; 
Brown v. Richards, supra, 840 P.2d at 154, n.10 (dicta; "both 
parties are entitled to fees when both parties are successful in 
enforcing different provisions of a contract against the other"). 
Citing Elder v. Triax Co., supra, 740 P.2d 1320, 1321-22 
(Utah 1987), Mountain States itself left open the opportunity for 
an award of fees when each party prevails on different claims, 
albeit in the context of claim versus counterclaim. Mountain 
States, 783 P.2d at 556 n. 8. 
In Triax, the plaintiff, a prime contractor, sued a 
subcontractor under a contract which provided for fees. The 
subcontractor denied liability and asserted permissive 
counterclaims arising from different contracts between the 
parties. 
The subcontractor further argued that the prime was not 
entitled to fees until the sub's counterclaim was resolved, 
citing several older cases which hold that fees under a note 
cannot be awarded until counterclaims are resolved, since only 
6
 Brown cites Trayner (along with two other cases) as being in 
conflict with the net judgment rule of Mountain States. Brown, 
840 P.2d at 154 n. 10. 
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then would accounts between the parties be settled. 74 0 P.2d at 
1321. The Utah Supreme Court disagreed, noting that these cases 
made sense only because early pleading rules required a 
"counterclaim" both to arise from the same transaction as the 
affirmative claim and to diminish or defeat the affirmative 
claim. Id. at 1322. Echoing Holmes' dictum, the court concluded 
that historical terminology alone was the only justification for 
denying the plaintiff fees pending resolution of unrelated 
counterclaims, since such counterclaims would not affect the 
plaintiff's claim. Id. 
Triax thus indicates that success or failure at litigation--
and thus fees--may be apportioned among discrete claims, although 
the case dealt with counterclaims. In a case nearly identical on 
its issues to the one at bar, the Washington Court of Appeals has 
recently taken the next step, addressing the question of who is 
entitled to fees when the plaintiff has alleged more than one 
claim but no counterclaim is raised. 
In Marassi v. Lau, 859 P.2d 605 (Wash. App. 1993), the 
plaintiffs dismissed 5 of the 12 claims of their complaint prior 
to trial, and then received an affirmative judgment on 2 of the 7 
claims tried. 859 P.2d at 606. Although Dynasty, the defendant, 
thus successfully defended against the five remaining claims, the 
court awarded fees to the plaintiffs as the "prevailing party" 
under the parties' contract. Id. The appellate court reversed. 
The court first noted that under the general rules 
governing fee awards, a "prevailing party" normally is one who 
receives an affirmative judgment, and that if neither party 
18 
wholly prevails then the party who "substantially prevails" is 
entitled to fees. 859 P.2d at 606-07. However, lf[t]hese general 
principles, . . . do not address situations in which a defendant 
has not made a counterclaim for affirmative relief, but merely 
defends against the plaintiff's claims." Id. at 607. In 
particular, the court held that the "net affirmative judgment 
rule" or the "substantially prevailing rule" yielded neither a 
fair nor just result in the case before it, since Dynasty 
successfully defended against a majority of claims at trial. Id. 
at 608. 
The court concluded that "when the alleged contract breaches 
at issue consist of several distinct and severable claims, a 
proportionality approach is more appropriate." Id. at 608. 
Under this approach, each party is entitled to fees upon those 
claims on which it prevailed. By awarding fees to defendants who 
succeed on particular claims, the courts thus serve the purposes 
of fee shifting: to discourage weak cases, encourage settlements, 
and restore a wronged party to original position. Id. 
Similarly, Florida's well-developed body of law governing 
fees is consistent with Marassi and the developing trend of Utah 
law. 
In response to a question certified to it by the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the Florida 
Supreme Court, in Folta v. Bolton, 493 So.2d 440 (Fla. 1986), 
rejected what it termed the "net winner rule" in multiple claim 
cases in favor determining entitlement to fees on a claim by 
claim basis. 4 93 So.2d at 442-43. Thus, the defendant was 
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entitled to fees expended on claims successfully defended 
against. Id. at 443. See also Consolidated Southern Security, 
Inc. v. Geniac & Assoc^., Inc., 619 So.2d 1027 (Fla. App. 1993) 
(trial court improperly attempted to "net out" from plaintiff's 
fee award the amount of time plaintiff's counsel spent on 
unsuccessful claim; under Folta, court should have instead 
accounted for time defendant spent in successful defense of the 
same claim); Park Lane Condominium Ass'n v. DePadua, 558 So.2d 85 
(Fla. App. 1990) (trial court erred under Folta in not awarding 
fees on a claim by claim basis, with defendant entitled to fees 
for claims successfully defended against). 
Triax, Brown, Marassi and Folta recognize that lawsuits are 
often made up of several distinct claims. Although Triax dealt 
with a counterclaim, Marassi and Folta take the next logical 
step, acknowledging that a defendant who does not counterclaim is 
no less entitled to fees for successfully fending off a claim 
than a defendant who prevails on a counterclaim. 
G&K's complaint alleged two distinct contract claims. The 
first sought liquidated damages. The second was a claim for 
services rendered. These claims arose from completely different 
facts. Pacific Bay's stipulation at the outset of trial on the 
open account claim had no effect on the liquidated damages claim. 
The claims could have been tried separately without effect on 
either one. 
Pacific Bay fully prevailed on the claim for liquidated 
damages, and was thus the "successful party" thereon. This claim 
consumed the majority of trial time. This is not a case where 
20 
Pacific Bay claims victory by virtue of whittling down G&K's 
claim for damages. Cf. Brown v. Richards, 840 P.2d at 155 
(defendant does not prevail on claim if his only success is to 
reduce damages awarded on claim). Instead, Pacific Bay claims 
victory on an entire claim, and has proved G&K the wrongdoer with 
respect to that claim. See Brown, 840 P.2d at 155 ("It is the 
determination of culpability, not the amount of damages, that 
determines who is the prevailing party."); Marassi, 859 P.2d at 
608 (permitting defendant to recover fees will discourage weak 
claims and restore party to its original position). 
In addition to citing the net judgment rule, the trial court 
suggested several reasons for why it did not award Pacific Bay 
any fees. These reasons are irrelevant under the law. 
The court believed that Pacific Bay's victory was not worth 
much. A claim's dollar value is not the arbiter of whether fees 
are to be awarded. See Brown v. Richards, 840 P.2d at 155 (trial 
court erred in not awarding fees to defendant for successful 
defense, even if the claim was only a minor part of the 
lawsuit).7 
The court was also piqued at Pacific Bay for not earlier 
paying G&K what Pacific Bay agreed at the outset of trial that it 
owed. In response, Pacific Bay argued that it did not pay G&K 
earlier because it wished to resolve the whole dispute at once, 
7
 Neither claim of this case involved significant sums. G&K 
was awarded judgment on its account claim in the amount of 
$4,575.21, and was denied recovery of the almost $2,000 in 
liquidated damages which it sought. The trial court's 
characterization of Pacific Bay's success as not worth much thus 
appears inaccurate in light of the total amount in controversy. 
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including the liquidated damages claim. Record, p. 3 72, Ins. 16-
23. Pacific Bay believed it had been treated improperly by G&K 
(as was borne out by trial), and was not of a mind to settle a 
portion of the case while G&K kept up its demands for liquidated 
damages. Pacific Bay does not believe its behavior was unusual 
or unexpected for a defendant. Regardless, Pacific Bay did not 
curtail its right to fees by not settling up with G&K until the 
whole case could be resolved. 
The court also indicated that its decision on fees might 
have been different had Pacific Bay made an offer of judgment. 
The court's reasoning on this latter point is unclear, since 
offers of judgment under Rule 68 entitle the party offering 
judgment to costs--but not fees--in the event additional monies 
are not recovered. Nelson v. Newman, 583 P.2d 601, 604 (Utah 
1978). See also Marassi v. Lau, 859 P.2d at 608 n. 6 (offer of 
judgment rule was not at issue in case). Pacific Bay's failure 
to make an offer of judgment is not relevant to whether it is 
entitled to fees. 
C. The Trial Court's Decision to Reduce G&K's Fees Rather 
than Award Pacific Bay Fees does not Satisfy the Law or 
Contract. 
Acknowledging that Pacific Bay prevailed on what it termed 
"some issues", the court reduced G&K's fee request from $2,080.00 
to $1,450.00, stating that it was "apportioning" fees. The court 
was not apportioning fees at all. Apportionment is what Pacific 
Bay now seeks. 
G&K, like any litigant, was never entitled to fees 
attributable to its failure at trial. See infra, § D. By 
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docking G&K's fee request, the court thus did only what the law 
already required. What the trial court did not do, however, was 
award Pacific Bay the fees attributable to its success at trial 
on an entire claim, not simply an "issue." This was error. See 
Consolidated Southern Security, Inc. v. Geniac & Assoc's., Inc., 
619 So.2d 1027 (Fla. App. 1993) (trial court improperly attempted 
to "net out" from plaintiff's fee award the amount of time 
plaintiff's counsel spent on unsuccessful claim; court should 
have instead accounted for time defendant spent in successful 
defense of the same claim). 
Irrespective of the mandatory reduction made to G&K's 
request, the trial court was obligated to award Pacific Bay the 
fees incurred in its success at trial. 
D. The Trial Court did not Make Sufficient Findings 
Concerning G&K's Fees. 
Although the court reduced G&K's fees, it made no findings 
concerning the amount of fees to which G&K was properly entitled. 
This was error. 
G&K is not entitled to fees for the time it spent 
unsuccessfully litigating issues.8 Mountain States notes that "a 
reasonable fee will compensate [the litigant] only for those fees 
necessarily incurred in resolution of issues in [the litigant's] 
favor, and should not include fees relating to the issues 
8
 Travner v. Cushing, 688 P.2d 856, 858 (Utah 1984) (per 
curiam); Paul Mueller Co. v. Cache Valley Dairy Ass'n, 657 P.2d 
1279, 1288 (Utah 1982); Stubbs v. Hemmert. 567 P.2d 168, 171 
(Utah 1977); Stacey Properties v. Wixen, 766 P.2d 1080, 1085 
(Utah App. 1988), cert, denied, 779 P.2d 688 (1989); Graco 
Fishing and Rental Tools, Inc. v. Ironwood Exploration, Inc., 766 
P.2d 1074, 1079-80 (Utah 1988). 
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resolved in [the other litigant's] favor." 783 P.2d at 556 n.10 
(emphasis added) .9 
Unlike those of Pacific Bay, G&K's labors at trial were 
almost completely unsuccessful. G&K is not entitled to fees for 
time spent at trial or in preparation for trial (and has already 
been paid once for such efforts) .10 Although the court properly 
cut G&K's fees, it erroneously made no findings concerning the 
amount of fees to which G&K was entitled. 
E. If Utah law Still Permits there to be Only One 
Successful Party Regardless of the Number of Claims 
Pled, Pacific Bay was that Party. 
Under our modern rules of procedure, attorney's fees should 
be awarded on a claim by claim basis. Utah law is consistent 
with such a rule. If, however, the Court believes there can be 
only one successful party even in a multiple claim action, that 
party was Pacific Bay. 
Like the defendant in Occidental/Nebraska Fed. Sav. Bank v. 
Mehr, Pacific Bay prevailed on the only claim actually litigated 
after it stipulated to an amount certain. The net judgment rule 
does not properly account for the posture of this case. See 
Mountain States, 783 P.2d 556 n. 7 (acknowledging that rule is 
not universally applicable). 
9
 See also Graco Fishing & Rental Tools, Inc. v. Ironwood 
Exploration, Inc., 766 P.2d 1074, 1080 (Utah 1988) (grant of 
attorney fees was remanded for a determination of only those fees 
attributable to the pursuit of successful claims); Brown v. 
Richards, 840 P.2d 143, 156 (Utah App. 1992) (trial court must 
make findings concerning fees attributable to claims on which 
party succeeded at trial). Here, none of G&K's fees are 
attributable to a success at trial. 
10
 See note 2, supra. 
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F. Pacific Bay is Entitled to Recover Fees on Appeal if it 
is Successful. 
If the contract permits recovery of fees in the trial court, 
as a matter of law it also permits recovery of fees on appeal. 
Management Services Corp. v. Development Associates, 617 P.2d 
406, 409 (Utah 1980). If Pacific Bay prevails on appeal, it will 
thus be entitled to fees expended thereon. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
In denying Pacific Bay its fees, the trial court erred as a 
matter of law. The court's judgment on fees should be reversed. 
DATED this \& day of May, 1994. 
LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene & MacRae 
Mark W.\ Dykes 
Counsel\for) Pacific Bay 
Baking Cotnpany 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing Opening 
Brief of Defendant/Appellant Pacific Bay Baking Company was 
served this 18th day of May, 1994, by depositing same in the 
United States mails, first class, postage prepaid, addressed to 
the following: 
Theodore E. Kanell 
Daniel L. Steele 
Hanson, Epperson & Smith 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180 
26 
Tab A 
THEODORE E. KANELL, Bar No. 1768 
DANIEL L. STEELE, Bar No. 6336 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 
P.O. Box 2970 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970 
Telephone: (801) 363-7611 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
G & K SERVICES, INC., a 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v* 
PACIFIC BAY BAKING, a 
Utah corporation, 
Defendant. 
1 JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 920002083CV 
Judge Michael L. Hutchings 
The Court, having heard evidence at trial on November 2 and 
3, 1993 and otherwise being fully advised in the premises 
following the bench trial on those dates, wherein all parties were 
present and represented by counsel; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiff is 
awarded judgment against the defendant in the amount of $4,575.21 
as due on account, plus $1,427.62 as prejudgment interest at the 
rate of 18 percent as called for in the contract between the 
parties, plus $1,450.00 in reasonable attorneys' fees as provided 
for in the contract, plus $93.00 in costs, for a total judgment of 
F f t r « *"\ i I r~ • * • *WE fefca. kfi^f 
DEC 2 0 1993 
T>:-C : . : _ 
Sail La-.;. J c , -
$7,545.83. This amount is now due and payable and is further 
subject to post-judgment interest at the contract rate of 18 
percent per annum for all amounts owing and unpaid upon entry of 
this judgment. n 
Dated this / / day of 
'MICHAEL L. HDTCHINGS 
Third Circuit Court Judge 
-2-
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T K«^«K,r certify that a copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT was 
.* , 
ma:.-, „~Laye p r e p a i d , Lins _ ^ . ^a\ of / i i'r ( '. . :/ \ , "  lil M 
*. -:. t he f o l l o w i n g : 
MarK __u , n ^ _ 
Attorney for Defendant 
1000 Kearns Building 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8 IJ 01 
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THEODORE E. KANELL, Bar No. 1768 
DANIEL L. STEELE, Bar No. 6336 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 
P.O. Box 2970 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970 
Telephone: (801) 363-7611 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
G & K SERVICES, INC., a 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
PACIFIC BAY BAKING, a 
Utah corporation, 
Defendant• 
1 FINDINGS 0/ FACT AND 
i CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
i (Revised) 
Civil Noy920002083CV 
Judge Michael L. Hutchings 
The trial, having come on regularly before this Court on 
November 2, 1993 from 9:30 a.m. until 12:30 p.m. and on November 
3, 1993 from 2:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m., with plaintiffs represented 
by Theodore E. Kanell and Daniel L. Steele of Hanson, Epperson & 
Smith and defendants represented by Mark Dykes and Steven Strong, 
and the Court having heard all evidence and being otherwise fully 
advised in the premises hereby enters the following findings of 
fact and conclusions of law. 
cz: - e FM 2 ^2 
'JS 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff G & K and defendant Pacific Bay were parties 
to a valid contract wherein G & K was obligated to provide Pacific 
Bay with goods and services including uniforms and laundry and 
linen supplies. 
2. Pacific Bay was in turn obligated to pay for these 
services pursuant to the terms of the contract* 
3. The original terms of the contract called for net ten 
payment term, meaning payment for goods and services rendered 
would be due on the tenth of the next month. 
4. For approximately three years however, G & K continued 
to honor its end of the contract while accepting payments from 
Pacific Bay on an approximately 60-day term basis contrary to the 
provisions of the contract. 
5. G & K's acquiescence in allowing Pacific Bay to 
establish a long record of payments for a term longer than 
specified in the contract constituted a course of performance. 
6. Thereafter, G & K attempted to deliver supplies to 
Pacific Bay on December 23 or 24 as required by the contract but 
since no check for payment was presented they did not deliver. 
7. Pacific Bay did not provide a check on December 23 or 24 
because G & K prematurely demanded payment for previous services 
when such payment was not yet due. 
8. Thereafter defendant informed plaintiff that it had 
retained the services of another supplier and would no longer need 
/3S 
the services of G ' F. 
9. On January 1992, plaintiff and its representatives 
" i l l I 1 II Il II III I III I M i l 
search reclaiming ~s goods then in the possession of t 
defendant and noting all lost goods which were returned 
. ' ""Il l i in b mi in in i i i i l 11 in I, mi I mi mi II I ( i II in ill in b a l a n c 
represents the value ot the goods lost m then in possession 
the defendant and not returned less depreciation of JJ percent 
o^ntrac s. 
10. The Court finds that there Is, by stipulation, owing 
$3,790.02. This amount represents amounts owing October, 
November and December but not including the December 24th and 
31st invoices. 
1 Court finds tha 
stipulated plaintiff :i s entitled to recover $785.19, which 
represents the depreciated amount owed on the January 27th invoice 
for unreturned merchandise. 
12. These amounts resulted amount ~4 $4,575.21 
which Defendants owed Plaintiff. 
13. Defendant has I i l n l r t r i i l e i i II M M \\ II I n 1 i n i i i iiiiiiiill i l i 1 1 • • 111 il  
owing for the invoices as totaled above. 
14. The October invoices totalling $1,573.90 which defendant 
1 ecember 
28, 1991. 
-3-
S3£> 
1 c
 The lovember invoices totalling $l f307.49 which 
defendant has stipulated — owing, were due for payment on or 
The December invoices totalling $908.63, excepting the 
December 24th and 31st invoices, which defendant has stipulated to 
Plaintiff cannot collect for the December 24th and 31 ; .1 , 
invoices because they failed to deliver the goods stated therein. 
Januar^ amount :: £ $ 3 85. 1 9 w as due >^n or before 
March , 1992. 
19. Plaintiffs were forced tc • i n :i t i a t e J ega II j: i: Dceed :i ngs I: :: 
I I i i I f.'h" amounts and showed up at trial prepared and willing 
to prosecute all of i ts claims including the amounts stipulated to 
by defendant. 
20. 1 11 in. i i i j s ent-i • m t e r e s t percent per 
annum as provided by the contract for the stipulated amounts and 
for the January 27 th amount. Thi u I'I'^IPHI sha ' > I. 'J1. 
modified due date forward to judgment. 
21. Interest on the October amounts past due twenty-two 
months for ^ i.ntul interest i.ttn1 1 M | IIF* r * • • > iiini i iiiiiii ! I! i 1 ^ . 
22. " iterest on the November amounts past due twenty-one 
months for total interest rate of __ _, _ percent comes v.w 
$411.86. 
23. Interest on the December amounts past due twenty months 
-4 -
/J7 
f^- a total interest rate of 30 percent comes ti $272.59. 
24. Interest •ru- January 27th invoice amounts past die 
ii in 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1# an award of 
$3,790.02 representing the amounts of the October, November and 
December invoices as stipulated to by defendant at the beginning 
2. Plaintiffs are further entitled to an award of $785,1) 
for the January 27th invoice outlining the inventory and goods 
I ill ill I mi i«l HI i iK1 I llij d e f e n d a n t t o p l a i n t i f f . 
3. This makes foi a total amount due and owing as a result 
of w**w invoices defendant has failed to pay 
4. Plaintiffs are further entitled ~-e i o 
percent interest per annum as provided for contract for 
these amounts which are past due and owing. 
5. 1 interest calculated on the 60-day payment term 
for each month totals 
6. As a result 
t - i e ,'!""• u" I'" I111"" i", I *yi) . the payment terms pursuant to the 
contract were modified from a net-10 term where payment was due 
the tenth c 
owing were due sixty days later. This course of performance which 
-5-
/JS 
modified the contract under the Uniform Commercial Code, was of 
nature where defendant would pay a mont worth of invoices 
plaintiff 
prematurely demanded payment December 23rd and failed 
deliver the goods breached its contract with defendant, aim 
quidateci damages otherwise 
provided for -he contract. 
7. However, plaintiffs are entitled as the preva 
compensal i on I • i, their attorneys' fees and 
costs. 
8. This Court has determined that reason^ 
c ilaintiff I". S I • "I ;i . This amount 
reasonable and just and plaintiff as tine prevailing party 
entitled to these amounts. 
9. Plaintiffs are further entitled A~ costs of court 
of $93.00 as outlined in their memorandum of costs filed herewith. 
10. Plaintiffs are therefo 
d i -111j * , 1 1 1 t if I i in j i in , i 
1 Plaintiffs will further entitled post-judgment 
interest percent per annu 
a I I rimounts not paid from the date this judgment is signed by the 
Court. 
-6-
/S? 
Dated this 
MICHAEL L. HUTCHING! 
Third Circuit Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify tha of the foregoing FINDINGS OF 
I? AC 1 1 ! NE CONCLUSION (Revised) were mailed,, postage 
prepaid, this 
U? /day of Qj 0 dJl'jjfat-J. 1993 • \\\v following: 
Mark W. Dykes, Esq. 
Attorney for Defendant 
1000 Reams Building 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84 
Awu 4ibc,c!& 
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THEODORE E. KANELL (1768) 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 
P.O. Box 2970 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970 
Telephone: (801) 363-7611 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT COUNTY 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
G & K SERVICES, INC., a COMPLAINT 
Corporation, 
PlainI III, 
PACIFIC BAT BAKING, a Utah 
Corporation, 
Defendant. 
Civil K. 
Judge 
-pMf 
The Plaintiff, ii k K Services , inc., for complaint 
against the Defendant above named alleges as follows: 
'
 ;
 ' 1. 3 • 
authorized to do business within the State of Utah. 
The cause action claim hereunder arose within 
Defendants operate their business I : 
the State of Utah. 
3. On or about the 12th day of April, 1988, the 
Defendants entered into a Textile Leasing Service Agreement, 
copies of which is attached hereto and marked as Exhibit "A". 
4. On or before January 7, 1992, the Defendant 
cancelled the Agreement mentioned above and therefore is 
responsible to pay liquidated damages as found in Paragraph 13 
of the Agreement. 
5. The Defendant has breached the agreement by their 
actions in cancelling the agreement prematurely. As a result of 
the premature cancellation, the Plaintiff is entitled to 
liquidated damages as spelled out by the agreement in the amount 
of $1,925.96. 
6. The Defendant has also breached the service 
agreement by failing to make payments on account when due, and is 
presently indebted to the Plaintiff, in the amount of $4,090.95, 
for past due services rendered. 
7. Pursuant to the agreement between the parties, the 
Defendant agreed to pay a reasonable attorney's fees and all 
necessary costs incurred in remedying the default. Said sums 
shall be proved at trial. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against the 
defendant as follows: 
1. For liquidated damages in the amount of $1,925.96. 
2 
J 
2. For the amount of $4,090.95 for past due services 
rendered. 
3. For reasonable attorney's fees to be proven at 
trial. 
4. For costs of Court and such other relief as the 
Court deems just and equitable in the premises. 
DATED this day of February, 1992. 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH 
Plaintiff's Address: 
1671 South 4370 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
THEODORE E. KANELL 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
84104 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
TEXTILE LEASING SERVICE AGREEMENT 
(/ 
G^ JC Services 
^Textile Leasing Systems 
: u u L/ u u J 
16/1 SOUTH 4370 W E S T 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 841 
AE/U*.ftft$ 13624 
SERVICE AGREEMENT. 
Pacicif> Bay Baking 
.. ("Customer") and Q&K SERVICES, U> 
i though fufty set forth on this side 
[0039-01 
THIS IS AN AGREEMENT between 
("Supplier") for the service described herein on the terms and conditions stated beiow and on the reverse side as 
1. Agreement to Supply. Supplier agrees to supply and Customer agrees to accept exclusively from Supplier, during the term of this Agr 
ment and any extensions or renewals hereof, all of Customer* requirements for the types of merchandise, equipment and services listed beiow at i 
prices there stated. If Customer requests additional amounts or types of merchandise, equipment or serviced, such additional merchandise, eat 
ment or services will be covered by this Agreement and u/tti be subject to the terms and conditions set forth herein. 
2. Prices* The prices and pricing method for Hems listed are stated below. Minimum or Rat rate charges are based upon total Inventory 
stalled and are subject to chance If inventory increases or decreases. However, a decrease in the mmb€t of Customers employees wJM not decree 
the weekly service charge unless an employee terminates his employment and Customer returns the fud number of garments issued to him. 
1 " ' • " • " • " 1. L«.J< »l 
IT6M DESCRIPTION _ 1 
I s h i r L * ] 
1 Pants 
I C o v e r a l l s 
L ined Jacket; 
Shoo Towls 
T e r r v / R i b Towels* 
4 2 " MOD' 
G r i l l Pad 
36" Mop 
3 x 4 Mat; 
4 x 6 Mat 
iMitt 
1 Charges will be made for Drape 
•W All p 
1 TOTAL y 
OFPERSONS 
1
 u J 1 " ' I 4 I ? 1 I 
CHANGES 
PER WEEK 
-
1 
WEEKLY CHARGE-] 
.. PER CHANGE 
•-"•[•so ' •• • 
-c»o 
Lto 
- A.z£ 
. 0 7 
•••• i /7* 
/.9f 
1 . * > / * 
ilO 
J.SO 
1 Jt/. tS 
1 +'7> 
. 'TOTAL 
WfeErCLY CHARGE 
ration of additional orders, names,' emblems and seasonal chartqeovers, 1 
rices are based on 55 
L i — M < — '•' 
[weeks par year wan ttce/ 
J . • n — m i m m m m m m II 1 I 1 I 
3. Supplier's Guarantee. Supplier guarantees that it will: 
a, Repair and return to Customer, on the next scheduled delivery day, an garments in nood o! repair; 
b. Return all merchandise in a useable condition; 
a Return all merchandise picked UP for cleaning the following scheduled delivery day; and 
d. Deliver in one week all addmen requesting standard size and color received on a regular delivery day. 
If Supplier fails to meet the guarantees Hated abovo, Customer will be entitled to a credit equal to the weekly charge for the non-conforming item. 
Supplier's failure to meet the above guarantees will not entitle Customer to cancel this Agreement 
4. Effective Date, This Agraemonl takes effect as ot the date of signing. For new Customers of Supplier, the estimated date of first installation is 
5. Price Increases, if Supplier^ costs of rendering services Increase during the term ot this Agreement or any renewal hereof, the priced of the 
services may be revised. Supplier will give Customer notice of such price changes by Invoice or by statement or other wntten notice. Customer agrees 
to accept such price changes so long as the changes do not represent an Increaae of more than 10% in the price of services being provided for any ona 
year period. If such price increases do Axraed 10% in any one year ported and Customer deckle* not to accept the cnange, Customer agrees to so notify 
supplier. If Customer so notifies Supplier, Supplier may, at Its sole option, either adjust the price Increase or cancel this Agreement. 
THE UNDERSIGNED CUSTOMER UNDERSTANDS AND ACCEPTS THE TERMS OF 1HE SERVICE AGREEMENT PRINTED ABOVE AND ON THE REVERSE. 
^ „ 535 West 800 south 
oty Woodcross 
Zip Code _ 8 i M 2 -
1x^4 GOMT*CU«*. 
salesman* Signature, 
Accepted By 
Q & K Services 
OFFICE COPY 
- i t rb£ l u . W k M M u & A ouAViuiio iU D 0 1 » I t I ruuo/ UUJ 
^ A. Payment of Charges, Charges wiiLbe due and payable in cash at time of.deliver* on if Customer* credit is 
orVJtye terflh day of tho riKKtm^ewfrg'o^lyeVY, Delinquent accounts - - --* - - — ~ - _«.^- . ___ 
..__. . , . . _ . . . „ ..._,. _,., « e subject fey^eVma^ * r *" 
when due wiliT>e subject to a service charge to be added thereto of one and one-half percent (lVfe%) per month (18% annually) until: 
7. J*m of Agreement This Agreement will continue until a date thirty-six (36) months from the date of first" installation '(for new' 
Customers) or the date Customer signs a renewal contract (for renews Ouatomett*) (Um "fexplratton Date"), it will then be renewed automatically 
for a period of one year unless written notice of non-renewal b given by either party to the dther atJeast sixty (60) days prior to the'Expiration Oate 
Subsequent renewal will oocur automatically on a yearly basis. ~' * " * 
of the Expiration Date. I. 
* u/iless, spAy, (60jF days written notice c*yion^sf\ewal is given pnor tetany anniversary 
8, Title to Merchandise* All merchandise and equipment provided to Customer under this Agreement will remain the.-property of 
Supplier. Customer must return 'all merchandise when soiled to Supplier and may noj, perhw any' other person to clean or launder it .Customer 
will be required to pay the depredated value'of all merchandise or equipment lost or damaged beyondrepair, (orojjnary. wear. and. (ear excepted) 
during the course of the agreement or not returned to Supplier at terrnination of the Agrooment •
 % » . i • • ' , . . • 
9. Depreciated Value. Depreciated value for the purpose of this Agreement will be determined by* deducting from Supplier's original 
list price four percent (4%) per month down to a minimum of fifty percent (50%) of list price. . .t - . »- • • 
10. SpecisUy»Pijrcha«»<! Merchandise, if Customer breaUie* 'mis Agreement or' gives notice of its termination, Customer agrees 
to buy, upon demand of Supplier, all of the following specially-purchased merchandise In-service or-held in stock by-Supplier under this 
Agreement at a price equal to its depreciated value as defined above. Customer * must pay tor such merchandise wlthm thirty (30) days of 
Supplier's demand. , , . - • * • J * . « . • • * 
ITEM NUMBER OF PERSONS CHANGES PER WEEK TOTAL INVENTORY 
'•a' s 
Sil 
-Krr: ?/>\^t-7^x 
-5U 
z*ki£»u~~. t ..S»..L- fv 
for ajry i 
5 ^ a^t£= sfez C" sqs i x > g f e * - - ^ - - . ^ ~ • < * -
it. Interruptions r lot Service.vSupplier win not be.tlable r Vr  interruption of SuppdeVs Usual operattonlldrtlor Se/ay, postpone-
ment or termination or the service provided for in this Agreement by reason of acts of-God, strikes,- lockouts, or other Industrial disturbances, 
wars, blockages, riots, arrests, .explosions, fires, floods, accidents to machinery or any other caueeAnpt within v^e^control of Supplier. 
12. Customer Warranty. Customer warrants that it b not presently under contract with any other party for the - tokening of the 
Items of services which are the subject matter of this .Agreement, and that this Agreement will itottcorisjriuie or result-in <Ji)e breach of 
any contractual relationships to which Customer is a party of by which it is bound. » ""• <" 
13. Liquidated Damage* Upon Breach* The parties rooognice and agree that if Customer should broach this Agreement or terminate 
this Agreement for any reason other than expressly permitted hereunder, the damages suffered by Supplier are not currently known or 
ascertainable. Therefore, the parties agree that in the event of such breach pr wrongful termination, Customer will pay to Supplier as liquidated damages, 
and not as a penalty; an amount equal to forty percent (40%) of the average weekly amounts invoiced to Customer multiplied by the number of weeks 
remaining In the term of the Agreement, beginning with the date of breach, $uoh payments will be in addition to all other amounts owed by Customer 
to supplier hereunder on the date of breach or wrongful termination. ! 
14. Change In Customer's Location, Supplier* .obligation, to serve, and Customer's obligation ..to..accept-service will continue even 
if Customer moves Its business to a different location, provided that the new location fa within Supplier^ route delivery area if Cuatonw 
does business at mure than one location, me Items required at-each; location will/be^delrvered to each/ such* location. Customer may not 
use any Items delivered to one location at any other location. ..", , ~j -^ , . *•/ \ ' 
15. Costs and Attorney's Fees. Cu$Uxnor agrees to pay Supplier any costs of collection incurred by Supplier \n enforcing Customer* 
nhtirjations under this Agreement, if Supplier must institute a feyai proceeding to collect Bny amount owing hereunder, then the unsuccessful 
party in such legal proceeding must pay to the successful party its reasonable attorneys' fees. 
16. No Warranty With Reaped to Merchandise, CUSTOMER ACKNOWLEDGES' ' T T W ' T H C ? GARMENTS RENTEDr UNDER THIS 
AGREEMENT ARE FOR GENERAL PURPOSES AND ARE' NOT-DESIGNED'. OR' RECOMMENDED FOR AREAS'OF FLAMMABILITY OR 
WHEN CONTACT WITH HAZARDOUS MATERIALS OR IGNITION SOURCES IS POSSIBLE/SUPPLIER'IS NOT THE'MAKER OF THESE 
GARMENTS AND HAS NOT MADE AND DOES NOT MAKE ANY REPRESENTATION, WARRANTY OR COVENANT, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, 
WITH RESPECT TO THE MERCHANTABIUTY FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR -PURPOSE, QUALITY, 'SAFETY OR SUITABILITY' OF THE 
GARMENTS FOR CUSTOMER USE. FXCFPT AS EXPRESSIY SET FORTH IN FAHAGnApi I 0 OF THIS AGREEMENT .. . ,.
 M ,.; 
17 Binding Agreement. This Agreement wilf be binding on 'and for* the benefit'of the'personal representative, • successors a n d 1 
assigns of th© partiesnensto. ,.,
 t .,» ,{n. , N ( . „« . ,» i < , i |nJ. »0 0,^ n,*r jo 5 f i foo*iO %+w •/v,o)oeis?'\ E-H1 .91* M r / r f v , ^ '• 
id Sevorabinty, tf any provision of thte Agreement is determined to be invalid by a court of competent jurisdiction, the remaining terms 
and conditions will,remain in.full force and effect.. .i«iM»ftrM ',{«•« nub «'• •*-w*i *• • VT*».J n.n"*W» to fipni ^iHiiqv,c* r .^u^in^m nr>nq <« 
19. Entire Agreement This Agreement constitutes the entire Agreement and includes ail understsndlngs^between the parties. Me waivers o r - ^ i 
Statements made by any representative of Supplier will be valid unless contained herein., .„*> .»,. ,{\ « \ >v,-k .* > ^ « •».,>' • jt».. k\ m 
20. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS %1 ! '1 '^If' ^r ,< ' f ^ '' 1_LL_" " 
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